A.1 Data sources We describe the full license of the original datasets and the URL for download.

The negative prompt used is " unrealistic, bad anatomy, wrong anatomy, extra limb, missing limb,

In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects corrupted data into a model's training dataset in order to gain control over its predictions on images with a specific attacker-defined trigger. A typical corrupted training example requires altering both the image, by applying the trigger, and the label. Models trained on clean images, therefore, were considered safe from backdoor attacks. However, in some common machine learning scenarios, the training labels are provided by potentially malicious third-parties. This includes crowd-sourced annotation and knowledge distillation. We, hence, investigate a fundamental question: can we launch a successful backdoor attack by only corrupting labels?

We evaluate our method on three well-known model architectures:, i.e., SSD [ Named Entity Recognition, and Question Answering. Find more details in Table 5. Recall, ROC-AUC, and Average Scanning Overheads for each model. A value of 1 indicates perfect classification, while a value of 0.5 indicates To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing detection methods for object detection models. We evaluate the IoU threshold used to calculate the ASR of inverted triggers. However, a threshold of 0.7 tends to degrade the Different score thresholds are tested when computing the ASR of inverted triggers.

Based on our large-scale study, we summarize our key findings as follows: Key findings.